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Descriptor English: Moral Risk in Supplementary Health Insurance
Descriptor Spanish: Riesgo Moral en los Seguros de Salud
Descriptor riesgo moral en los seguros de salud
Entry term(s) riesgo moral
riesgo moral en salud
Scope note: Si el asegurado conoce sus riesgos mejor que el asegurador, puede asegurar su cobertura pagándola más barata que lo que debiera ser de acuerdo con su nivel de riesgo. Si debido a ese fenómeno, el asegurador enfrenta demasiados malos riesgos, entonces, estará obligado a aumentar sus primas alejando al mismo tiempo a los buenos riesgos. En este caso, el asegurador se ve afectado por la asimetría de la información: 1) El asegurado, al estar cubierto, adopta comportamiento riesgosos que el asegurador no es capaz de detectar. Los aseguradores aplican franquicias y copagos para minimizar este riesgo; 2) los médicos pueden ofrecer servicios a los pacientes con el único objetivo de maximizar su ingreso sin que el asegurador pueda controlarlo. (De: https://bit.ly/2gNLzvf)
Descriptor Portuguese: Risco Moral no Setor de Saúde Suplementar
Descriptor French: Risque Moral en Santé Complémentaire
Entry term(s): Moral Risk
Moral Risk in Complementary Health Insurance
Moral Risk in Private Health Insurance
Moral Risk in Supplemental Health Insurance
Tree number(s): SP1.101.750.540.430.563
Scope note: If the insured knows his risks better than the insurer, he can insure his coverage by paying it cheaper than what should be according to his level of risk. If due to this phenomenon, the insurer faces too many bad risks, then it will be forced to increase its premiums while moving away from good risks. In this case, the insurer is affected by the asymmetry of the information: 1) The insured, when covered, adopts risky behavior that the insurer is not able to detect. Insurers apply franchises and co-payments to minimize this risk; 2) medical staff can offer services to patients with the sole purpose of maximizing their income without the insurer being able to control it. (Free translation from: https://bit.ly/2gNLzvf)
Allowable Qualifiers: No qualifiers
History Note: 2019
DeCS ID: 58019
Unique ID: DDCS058019
Documents indexed in the Virtual Health Library (VHL): Click here to access the VHL documents
Moral Risk in Supplementary Health Insurance - Preferred
Concept UI FD00062287
Scope note If the insured knows his risks better than the insurer, he can insure his coverage by paying it cheaper than what should be according to his level of risk. If due to this phenomenon, the insurer faces too many bad risks, then it will be forced to increase its premiums while moving away from good risks. In this case, the insurer is affected by the asymmetry of the information: 1) The insured, when covered, adopts risky behavior that the insurer is not able to detect. Insurers apply franchises and co-payments to minimize this risk; 2) medical staff can offer services to patients with the sole purpose of maximizing their income without the insurer being able to control it. (Free translation from: https://bit.ly/2gNLzvf)
Preferred term Moral Risk in Supplementary Health Insurance
Entry term(s) Moral Risk
Moral Risk in Complementary Health Insurance
Moral Risk in Private Health Insurance
Moral Risk in Supplemental Health Insurance



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